``The biggest single complaint ... is companies establish what the rules are, then they invest $50 million to $100 million, and the next year the Legislature comes out and changes the rules ... . We've got to find a means of developing security of the rules'' (The Independent Record 1999). Similarly, the Executive Director of the Montana Mining Association remarked:`M ontana's process for granting permits to new mines is so difficult, expensive and time-consuming that major companies have written the state off'' (The Independent Record 1999). (2) Indeed, over the last decade, the`time to permit' increased, not by months, but by years.
Yet this is the same Montana mine-permitting process which, twelve years prior to Canyon's announcement, had allowed the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Pegasus Gold Company (Pegasus) to boast of Montana's outstanding investment opportunities and its friendly regulatory system at a plenary session of the Northwest Mining Association. (3) In particular, he pointed to the completion and successful permitting of Pegasus's Beal Mountain Project. For this project it took Pegasus only five months to negotiate the permitting processöa time frame much shorter than the current average in Montana and the USA as a whole. Moreover, since that statement was made, the Montana mine-permitting process has remained relatively unchanged, yet the time to permit continues to lengthen. (4) Today a typical mine-permitting process takes six to ten years. The formal structures of the state reveal no changes, yet the intractability of the process tells another story.
Of all components in the permitting process, it is the determination of the environmental impacts of mining that has contributed most to the extended delays during the past decade. In 1989, for example, Canyon initiated environmental-baseline studies at the proposed mine site, as required by the mine-permitting process. Over the next seven years, grass-roots and other environmental NGOs challenged Canyon's representation of its environmental data collection and analysis of the ecosystem which was to be affected by the proposed mine. The success of these groups can be quantified in the increasing amount of time spent in the preparation and analysis of the baseline environment. If the claims of these groups were frivolous or not supported scientifically, they could have been immediately rejected by the state. Yet, it is not the efficacy of the environmental groups, or their mounting of a successful counterhegemonic project, that is the focus of this paper. Rather, it is the process by which the minepermitting process was redefined and discursively`reregulated' over the course of a decade without any changes in the law or institutions of accumulation. (5) What happened to the mine-permitting process? Why, at one point, was it the blessing of the industry and what changed a decade ago to reverse this? The industry spokespeople are right: the process has become increasingly difficult. The challenges presented to the mining industry by the mine-permitting process, however, derive not from any change in the formal rules governing mining. Rather, the permitting process is increasingly difficult because of changes in the way the environment is represented. During the early years of permitting, the environment was represented in the process by engineers who viewed the mining^environment relationship as a (2) A`major company' here means one which operates with more than a pick and shovel. (3) Interview with John Fitzpatrick, Government and Community Relations Officer, Pegasus Gold Company, 6 August 1996; interview with Ta Li, cofounder, Denver Gold Group, 20 October, 1998. (4) In 1993 the industry sought and was granted changes to water-quality legislation. The legislature complied with the industry's request through Senate Bills 330 and 331. So, if anything, the process has been weakened. (5) In fact, the reregulation of the industry emerged over a much longer period of time (see Krueger, 2001 ). function, of technology. In contrast, during the 1990s, the process came under the influence of environmentalists who rejected the`engineering paradigm' and expanded the representation of the environment to include an`ecological' sensibility. As a result of this discursive shift, investment in Montana's gold reserves became a losing propositionödespite the availability of world-class gold deposits, the technology and labor force to extract them, adequate finance capital to fund development, and the institutions of accumulation being in place.
In this paper I argue that the mine-permitting process provides a point of mediation between capital accumulation and regulatory politics. I explore the relationship between the mine-permitting process and capital accumulation by locating the goldmine-permitting process in terms of regulation. (6) The concept of`regulation' is appropriate here because it appears that the mine-permitting process has failed to reproduce a viable gold mining industry. To access this mediating layer of activity, my analysis is focused on Montana's unique landscape of politics, ideas, and cultural reference points that bring to life the mine-permitting process. Regulation can now take on a slightly new meaning. Here, it is defined as those relationships between the knowledge of actors, their methods for adjudicating knowledge claims, and the ways they create and interact with institutions, laws, and ideas in particular places and times.
The paper has five subsequent sections. I begin with a sympathetic review of the regulationist concept of`reregulation' in the context of resources and the environment. On the basis of this theoretical review, and the empirical circumstances in Montana, I then draw upon cultural economic geography to relocate regulation in a more fitting context. Next, I describe the development of the Montana mine-permitting process. Fourth, I examine the mine-permitting process in practice, using two permitting processes as case studies. The cases represent the two periods of mine permitting: 1969^89 and 1990^99. In the final section I draw together some conclusions.
Structural change and the economy^environment relationship
In 1951 resource geographer Erich Zimmerman remarked that``resources are not, they become'' (page 2). Over the past decade, how resources`become' and, perhaps, become again and again, is a topic which has received much analytical attention from those of a political^economic bent. This interest in the relationship between capitalism and resource development has amounted to a critique of Zimmerman's notion, which resembles the neoclassical view, that nature is`noise' and resources are the raw materials of`progress'. For example, Emel et al (1992) examined several ideological bases of property and resource allocation to explain the geographical variation in water resource management institutions. This view suggests that abstract forces in the form of capitalist social relations determine what is noise and what is of value. Resources, then, still`become' in this new political^economic examination, but how they do so is reconceptualized. For example, in contrast to the neoclassical view that resources and the institutions that manage them emerge from rational actors and the logic of efficiency, for Emel et al, this is not the case. Rather, they rely on a historical materialist approach to analyze groundwater management:`M aking clear the historical foundations of modern ideas of property is necessary for any possibility of a geography of resources that differs from resource economics wherein social relations with nature are treated as eternal and inevitable'' (1992, page 51).
(6) For a discussion about`regulation' as theoretical approach, and`regulation' as mode of concrete research, see Painter and Goodwin (1997) .
This method of analysis, which is focused on the superstructural characteristics of Marx's bifurcated capitalist model, held sway until the mid-1990s when regulation theory, a meso level political^economic approach (Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 1990; Lipietz, 1986) , was widely adopted by geographers interested in the link between environment and capitalism (Bridge, 1998; Gandy, 1997; Gibbs, 1996; Gibbs and Jonas, 2000 ; also see Lipietz, 1992) . Though long used by economic geographers analyzing labor markets (see Peck, 1996) and the coupling between economic space and labor (Harvey, 1989) , among other things, regulationism provided resource geographers with a conceptual framework for linking social institutional forms to the material basis underpinning Marx's capitalism. Regulationism emphasizes the many forms that capitalism takes. For regulationists, different institutional ensembles mediate contradictions that may arise. Thus, temporary periods of accumulation reveal different institutional configurations to contain contradictions associated with different social relations and productive forces: for example, the Keynesian welfare state that managed US economic growth during the postwar era. For a more in-depth review of regulationism see Bakker (2000) and Bridge and McManus (2000) .
Regulationist accounts of the capital^environment relationship differ from earlier political^economic approaches in their assertion that institutions and their ideological contradictions will ultimately be restructured by way of technological change, institutional change, or a discursive reordering to eliminate barriers to further accumulation. In other words, a failed regime of accumulation will lead to a subsequent period of growth, which develops by restructuring political^economic relations to account for the contradictions of the previous regime. Regulationist accounts of the geography of resource development examine these regime changes in terms of the relationship between resource-management institutions, extraction firms, and the technical means of resource development (see Bridge, 2000; Haughton, 1998; Hayter and Barnes, 1997, respectively) .
In the past, regulationists have linked these driving forces with extant conditions at the national and/or global scale, that is, they have linked institutional ensembles or structures of governance to more general processes of capital accumulation. For instance, Gibbs (1996) analyzed whether a post-Fordist regime of accumulation might be more environmentally sustainable and less materially intensive if it were ascriptive to the emergent ethos of ecological modernization. In this case, Gibbs coupled the regulatory opportunities and constraints of environmental management regimes within a generalized set of`economic logics' represented by a regime of accumulation (that is, Fordism, post-Fordism). What is implied here is that each regime of accumulation has a discreet ensemble of institutions, each with its own inherent logic.
Whereas Gibbs and others focused on national or global regulation, more recently scholars have analyzed environmental/economic regulation in more concrete terms, such as regional or local struggles to restore conditions of accumulation (Bakker, 2000; Bridge and McManus, 2000; Gandy, 1997; Gibbs and Jonas, 2000) . For instance, Gandy (1997) analyzes the history of the public management of New York City's water supply. Gandy goes beyond the`teleological concepts' of Fordism and post-Fordism to suggest that the crisis of New York City's water supply can be interpreted``as a local manifestation of a broader crisis in the regulation of the ecological contradictions of capital '' (1997, page 350) . Although Gandy links New York's current water resource allocation problems to regulatory changes associated with the demise of Fordism, he also shows that beyond these more abstract changes the local New York experience also has a great deal to do with the ideological crisis of the local state. Similarly, Haughton (1998) utilizes the regulationist approach to situate the Yorkshire, England, drought of 1995 in terms of a transition in the resource-management regime, from a state-based to a market-based one (see also Bakker, 2000) . Implicit in the accounts both of Gandy and of Haughton is the notion that regulatory changes, or reregulation, implies basic structural or institutional change. As I pointed out above, however, Montana's regulatory system has remained structurally intact, though it has produced very different sets of environmental outcomes.
Scholars linking regulationism with theories of governance (Gandy, 1997; Jessop, 1994) , urban-regime theory (Gibbs and Jonas, 2000; Painter and Goodwin, 1997) , and discourse theory (Bakker, 2000; Bridge, 1998; Haughton, 1998) illustrate the versatility and efficacy of the approach to linking environmental themes to regulatory institutions. From the review above, it appears that for regulationists to locate reregulation within regimes, fundamental changes need to accompany institutions of accumulation. The malleability of the regulation approach, coupled with the theoretical issues raised by the cultural turn in economic geography, make it possible to redirect the concept of regulation yet again.
Discursive influences on economy^environment relationships
Recent work in economic geography creates an opportunity to explore the regulatory politics of the Montana gold mining industry and, more generally, to explore the transformations of institutions of accumulation through discursive practices rather than structural changes. Some political^economic geographers are beginning to grapple with the role of noneconomic forms in the reproduction of economic systems. This line of scholarship, commonly referred to as the`cultural turn', is flourishing as economic geographers revisit erstwhile monoliths of economic`rationality' through new theoretical lenses and apply new methodologies (Barnes, 1996; Gibson-Graham, 1996; McDowell, 1997; O'Neill and Gibson-Graham, 1999; Peet, 1997; Pratt, 1999) . In terms of theory, Crang (1997) observes that``content is being rethought in terms of what social and spatial portions of life count as economic, what portions (if any) are therefore non-economic, and how these designated spheres of the economic and noneconomic interrelate'' (page 4). Theoretical scrutiny is aimed at the economic subject, or`rational actor',`to systems of actors and institutions operating at meso and macro economic scales.
To capture the influence of history and culture on economic relations requires an engagement with discourse (O'Neill and Gibson-Graham, 1999; Peet, 1996; Pratt, 1999) . The concept of discourse is often linked to the work of Foucault. Foucault challenged the notion of a single, rational, subject, arguing instead that subjects have no a priori existence. For Foucault, subjects are the outcome of historical social processes embedded in ways of knowing the world. Discourse analysis is a means of understanding these processes through concrete explorations. The emphasis on the local does not imply a turn to relativism but, rather, an inductive approach, that provides a lens of greater magnification to explain more generalized relations (see Foucault, 1980) . Thus, for Foucault, the truth cannot be conceived through theoretical abstraction but can only be understood through the analysis of truth effects produced by powerk nowledge. In short, for cultural economic geographers, economic behavior and economic processes can no longer be confined to the immediate activities of production or objectified behaviors (see Peet, 1997) . Similarly, there is no pure or privileged view of the worldöa world in which all political and social activity can be linked to`the economic' (Gibson-Graham, 1996) . This said, could not the same be said of regulation? If discourse analysis is a means of theorizing how actors come to understand themselves, their capabilities, and the world around them as situated practices, then outputs of these subjectivities can also be understood as situated practicesöin this instance, institutions of accumulation. The development of an account of reregulation in Montana's gold mining industry requires an engagement with the messiness of everyday life where institutions are not monoliths guided by the logic of accumulation, but vibrant and dynamic systems that are fraught with conflict and contradiction. The Montana regulatory system is an institution (or ensemble of institutions) encoded and recoded by cultural praxis.
Regulationist have broached the subject of discourse analysis; however, their approach is somewhat different from the analysis proposed here. Bridge (1998) , for example, uses discourse theory to illustrate how companies appropriate discourses of the environment and labor to restore conditions of profitability. Similarly, Bakker (2000) grafts discourse analysis onto regulation theory to show that regulation is itself a discursive practice. Her account of a regulationist theory of discourse, like Bridge's, is focused on capital using discourse to restructure, or reproduce, its means of accumulation, or its profitability, respectively. Bringing discourse into regulationism, as Bakker and Bridge have done, adds a nuance to previous regulationist accounts. The approach offered here differs in focus in that I look at discourse through the lens of regulation, not the expression of a particular set of interests. Discourse here is not necessarily associated with a particular interest or regulatory regime: rather, the discourse emerges from the struggle among numerous actors to make sense out of the mine-permitting process.
The notion that knowledge about the world is a local process of historical and social importance allows the geographical richness (or messiness) of social and economic relations to emerge. Understood in this way, it is possible to envision multiple, even contradictory, outcomes coexisting simultaneously in the same system. Engaging regulation from this perspective provides an opportunity to flesh out the role of representation and economic regulation. We can now begin to explain the vagaries of the Montana gold mining economy.
Regulating' the industry^environment relationship in Montana Although it has swung over the past decade, Montana's mine-permitting process was conceived in an earlier eraöduring a time of fundamental political and economic change in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The framers of reform, although they sought to continue to maximize Montana's resource endownment for economic gain, desired a fundamental change in how the relationship between economy and environment was regulated. They argued that the`rape and run' attitude of the old days should and could no longer govern the industry. (7) To accomplish this goal, the Montana regulatory framework was changed fundamentally. In addition to other, broader, reforms, the Montana legislature passed the Metal Mine Reclamation Act and designated the Montana Department of State Lands regulator of the metal mining industry. For the first time, a state agency would be responsible for overseeing the development of mineral resources in Montana. up the side of the mountain to the plateau. Following the ranger's directions, Fagg got to the location of the trail. However, rather than a faint trail, Fagg discovered a road about 80 ft wide, designed for 20-ton trucks. After returning to Billings, Fagg learned that he had come across an exploration road which had been built over the faint trail by the Anaconda Copper Company to explore a platinum/palladium deposit in the Stillwater Valley. Fagg was incensed to find that a road of this size could be constructed without concern for the fragile tundra on the Beartooth Plateua. It was not that Fagg wanted to see mining come to an end: rather, he sought to foreground`other' values from Montana's extant landscape, such as aesthetic and recreation values. (11) To that end, the Fagg's House Bill 243 Act sought to put in place a system for determining and analyzing the environmental impacts of mining.
Miners saw these`other landscape values' as a threat to their vocation and a challenge to their own environmental views. They suggested that signing the Bill would be tantamount to``signing a warrant of execution for the industry''. (12) Miners were not used to having their economic activity seen as destructive to nature, and they considered any attempt to mediate their activity absolute lunacy. For them, the minerals in the earth are its only value:`M any of us ... have held on having recognized this event (13) was ineviatable with the hope of contributing to the development of Montana's great resources.'' (14) Even if mining was not the only use of the land, minerals represented the`highest' use of the land.`T he true facts are and always have been, that the miners are benefiting [sic] everyone in finding this NEW wealth and producing in metals so all people can enjoy all things made of metals. Miners should be helped instead of infringed upon by exploiting them with impossible controls.'' (15) Mining interests also believed the proposed mining law was discriminatory:`t his bill is grossly restrictive toward persons engaged in exploration and mining. It allows for, however, non-mining groups to disturb the land without licenses or penalties.'' (16) For the first time in Montana's history the mining industry was forced to justify its transformative activities. For several months, corporate mining interests, with the ardent support of small miners, detained hardrock-law reform. (17) However, on a Sunday morning in March, the small-miner exclusion was born. Without help from small miners, Anaconda and other mining firms could not muster the political clout to defeat Fagg's bill.
Because previous efforts to provide for voluntary regulation had failed, the legislature was ready to move on a hardrock law. As Jim Posewitz, a senior administrator at Montana's Commission of Fish and Game remarked:`B etween 1963 and 1969, environmental legislation consisted of some pretty bland material, notably`voluntary strip mined land reclamation' and a dredge mined land reclamation act that later failed to survive the test of constitutionality... . All the laws on the books, however, failed to curb the abuses maximizing profits heaped on the land''. (18) However, between these two viewsönature as noise/nature has value öis where the law emerged. Still privileging mining as a rightful use of the land, the framers of the law sought a more disciplined approach to the process of mine development and reclamation. The preamble of the Law states:`T he extraction of minerals by mining is a basic and essential activity making an important contribution to the economy of the state and the nation. At the same time, proper reclamation of mined land and former exploration areas not brought to the mining stage is necessary to prevent undesirable land and surface water conditions detrimental to the general welfare, health, safety, ecology, and property rights of the citizens of the state'' (MCA 52-1-1401). This emphasis on mine development and reclamation reifies the notion that mining is one of a number of land uses. However, rather than turning each mining proposal into a political struggle over the most appropriate land use for a potential mine site, the legislature sought objectivity through abstraction. To accomplish this, it deployed the discourse of science to underpin the regulatory process. In other words, mine permitting would be removed from the realm of politics to the realm of science. This objectivity through abstraction was acceptable to both sides because both sides could agree that the right science would produce the right outcome. Toward this end, a three-part mine-permitting process emerged.
(1) Environmental baseline studies are designed to identify and document existing environmental conditions at a proposed mine site (for example, water quality, species of birds and other animals on or near the site). Neither statute nor regulation defines what these objects are or how they should be measured (for example, what techniques or levels of certainty should be employed). Instead, the protocols are determined by negotiation between the petitioning company and state regulators, on a permit-by-permit basis.
(2) A plan of operations describes precisely what activities will take place during the production phase (under conditions of known reserves). Again, the particulars are not statutorily defined. Typically, the information required for this phase to be completed successfully includes where the pit will be located, its depth, the location of on-site processing facilities, location and width of roads, and the type of benefication technology to be used (for example, heap leach or mill). Will the company mine sulfide or oxide ores, or both? Mining companies usually submit a plan of operations that balances economic and technological feasibility. Thus, they establish the basis of the project in their own terms. (3) Reclamation plans describe how those lands disturbed by mining activity will be restored. How will the company store topsoil during operations? What land uses will the site be reclaimed for? How will the company monitor the site after operations cease in order to prevent future pollution? The regulatory agency uses the data from each of the previous components to determine the bonding levels required for the project. Once an application is deemed complete, by state regulators (typically five iterations and several years) bonding requirements are set and the company receives a permit.
The mine-permitting process provided the pivot that mediated between the costs and benefits of mining and other lands uses. Consequently, a discourse that upheld thè logic' of capitalist accumulation was ostensibly preserved as the legislature`produced' a nature that was amenable to blasting caps, electric superloading shovels, and 300-ton haul trucks. Yet, although reformers intimated that resource extraction was an essential (18)``T he ecological element-resources of the future'', speech prepared for the Governor's Symposium Series, 24 October 1972. component of Montana's future prosperity, these institutional reforms proved to be more ambivalent toward the industry.
The following cases capture the cultural change in regulation to which I have been alluding above. The Zortman^Landusky case is representative of the modus operandi of the permitting process from 1969 to 1989. During this time, the regulation of mining changed very little from the situation in previous years, with a major exception being procedural documentation. That is, the decisionmaking process became transparent instead of taking place inside mining company headquarters. The New World case opens the next era of mine permitting (1989 to the present). Despite the unique set of circumstances that surrounds the New World Mineöits proximity to Yellowstone National Park, and President Clinton's intervention in the processöthe case captures the fundamental change in the representation of nature in the regulatory process; especially when juxtaposed with the Zortman^Landusky case.
Regulating the modern-day gold rush in Montana
With the basic tenets of the mine-permitting process established, we can now ask the question driving this paper:``what happened to Montana's mine-permitting process?'' I wish to begin this analysis with an examination of the permitting process as it was practised by examining how nature was constructed through the process.
The Zortman^Landusky permit
Montana's modern-day gold rush began in earnest in 1978 when two companies applied for an operating permit under the Montana Metal Mine Reclamation Act.
The two proposed open-pit gold mines, the Zortman and the Landusky, came on-line in 1979. Mining was not new to the Little Rocky Mountains, where the Zortman and Landusky mines are located. It first began in the 1890s when prospectors mined the placer deposits of the area. Later, the Little Ben Mining Company built a processing mill in Ruby Gulch. This company operated mines and processed ores intermittently on several claims for about thirty years.
Operating for several years under a small-miner exclusion permit, the Zortman and Landusky Mining companies, which were separate corporate entities, explored the Little Rocky Mountain Historical Mining District. The purpose of these activities was to establish the availability of sufficient and recoverable reserves on mining claims to secure project financing from Canada. After the companies were guaranteed production finance from Canadian venture-capital markets, they sought to obtain metal mine operating permits. Because of the proximity of these proposed mines, the state decided to consider them simultaneously: for accounting purposes they would operate under separate permits; however, in terms of their environmental impact, they would be one entity.
When constructed, these two gold mines would be the largest the state had seen even if considered independently of each other. The plan of operations established the following broad parameters for both mines. The life span of the proposed mines was anticipated to extend for 18^20 years, with total combined production exceeding 44 million tons of ore (ZL, page 12). (19) The proposed ore-benefication technology was the cyanide heap-leaching method. Ore would be trucked from the pits to the leach sites where a cyanide solution would be applied in a closed-circuit leaching process. Leach heaps would be placed on 8in^12in thick pads of bentoniteöan impervious clay. The surface dimensions of the pads would be 800 ft Â 800 Â 40 ft. When the mine reached full production capacity, the mine plan indicated that it (19) Zortman^Landusky Draft EIS 1978; copies of the EUs drafts, letters, etc are held by the Montana Department of Environmental Quality's Hardrock Bureau.
would move one million tons of ore per year, at a rate of 5000 tons per day (ZL, page 12). Although this amount of processed ore may appear to contain a vast gold resource, and it does, the estimated gold values in the ore were between 0.002 and 0.003%. These values are the equivalent to approximately 1 ounce of gold per ton of ore that is blasted, shoveled, hauled, and placed on a leach pad.
Wilbur Crisswell oversaw the permitting process for the state. The Hardrock Bureau's first Chief, Crisswell was referred to by many as`a man of the times'. Crisswell had come over from the private sector: specifically, he had worked for, and later been fired by, the Anaconda Copper Company. A mine engineer by training, Crisswell worked for Ananconda until the tailings impoundment at the Mike Horse Mine, located near Lincoln, Montana, failed. Crisswell was the chief engineer for the tailingsimpoundment project and, consequently, became`unhirable' in the private sector. (20) Despite his previous experience and pro-mining bias, Crisswell executed the minepermitting process without incident: it was quick, relatively uncontroversial, and it aspired to uphold the law while giving the companies what they asked for. A review of the mine-permitting process shows that, for Crisswell and his bureau associates, the relationship between the process of gold production and the host environment was an unproblematic one. In particular, this can be seen in the context of phase one of the permitting processöthe environment baseline study. The uncertaintities regarding baseline conditions were readily acknowledged in the baseline study reports and the environmental impact statement (EIS). For example, an analysis of the annual precipitation on mining operations states:`c limatic data for the Little Rocky Mountains has been recorded representing conditions at lower elevations. Climatic parameters vary with elevation ... . Higher elevations undoubtedly receive additional precipitation and higher snowfall (ZL, page 21). Groundwater-quality investigations were equally vague:`G roundwater Quantity: Although no formal investigation has been done concerning groundwater in the Little Rockies, past mining operations have encountered water at various levels and time'' (ZL, page 36; emphasis mine).`G roundwater Quality Around the Processing Areas In Particular There is very little information available on local groundwater conditions at the Zortman processing site'' (ZL, pages 43^44; emphasis mine). Together, the environmental baseline studies and the plans of operations created a set of consequences that are described in the EIS. However, despite their admitted uncertainty concerning the environmental baseline conditions, when it came to describing the potential impacts of the projects on the environment the EIS was not short of detail. In fact, there is an interesting juxtaposition between uncertainty and detail: for example:`A lthough there is no detailed technical information describing groundwater movement in the proposed mining areas, it is assumed that most of the water trapped in the pit will seep into the fractured bedrock and become part of the regional groundwater system and any impacts to groundwater quality would probably be undetectable. The infiltration of surface water to the groundwater system would be very localized and should not cause any measurable change in groundwater quality'' (ZL, page 75). ``Because of the utilization of both membrane and clay liners it is not anticipated that either operation will have significant effect on groundwater quality during normal operations'' (ZL, page 79). On 17 May 1979, the Hardrock Bureau announced that it would adopt the draft EIS as the final EIS, thus ending the permitting process. In two weeks the agency issued a record of decision (ROD) and the State Board of Land Commissioners signed off the project. The hardrock law had passed its first major test on a gold mine. The law had apparently provided a cost-effective way of determining potential environmental costs and the provision of mitigation for undue environmental impacts. What the`environment' was, however, was largely unknown in this case. These unknowns were viewed by regulators as unproblematic, as the mining technology was thought to reduce potential risks to the environment to within acceptable levels. As expressed through the discourse of the mine-permitting process, the point of mediation between the mine and its impact was located in the mine-development plan, where technology in particular would determine both environmental impact and reclamation needs. The environment was thus represented as a discreet and benign entity that could be acted upon without consequence.`T he mine from hell'': the permitting process for the New World Mine
Five new gold mines were permitted and dozens of permit expansions granted between the Zortman^Landusky Mine (1979) and the New World Mine (1990). With one exception, none of these mines reached the size of the Zortman^Landusky Mine. As the state's gold mining economy expanded, the Department of State Lands created new positions and experienced some staff turnover. Wilbur Crisswell retired from the Bureau. Positions in the Department's Hardrock Bureau were filled with people holding degrees in environmental science, hydrogeology, and mine reclamation. For the most part, the new cadre of bureau professionals had not worked in the mines, but understood them in terms of their interface with the biogeochemical process of the Earth. In addition, problems at the state's gold mines and a notorious copper mine, the Berkeley Pit, raised awareness among people concerned with the health of Montana's unique ecosystems as well as their own health. In short, the 1990s brought a torrent of interest in the impacts of mining on human health and the environment. As a result, Montana became a crucible for the clash over the mining^environment relationship. Despite these new sensibilities, the inertia of history proved difficult to overcome.
The story of the New World Mine begins in July 1987, when a businessman and venture capitalist from Billings, Montana, began to raise capital to explore the New World Mining District. The New World District lies roughly 9500 ft above sea level, on the Beartooth Plateau, about 140 miles southwest of Billings, Montana and 2 miles North of Yellowstone National Park in Wyoming. Spring arrives here in July, with winter following in August! After favorable mineralogy was reported from drilling, a Canadian mining company, Noranda Minerals, became interested in the project. Further drill tests defined deposits that were economically viable to extract using a combination of open-pit heap-leach technology and underground mining. In November 1990, after company feasibility studies had been completed, Noranda submitted a permit application to the state of Montana. Submission of this application initiated what would become a six-year battle over the fate not only of the New World Mining District, but also of Yellowstone Park and the conscience of the country.
Because of the proximity of the mine to Yellowstone Park, the company, as well as the state and federal agencies knew the mine would be controversial from the beginning. In order to mitigate public outcry, they chose to involve the public throughout the whole process. The New World Task Force was developed; this comprised interested people, environmental groups, the company, and state and federal officials. Over the next six years, the company prepared its mine-permit application, five versions in all, and the agencies, the task force, and the public evaluated it in turn.
In the spring of 1990, the company submitted draft baseline-study plans to the state. Both state and federal agencies agreed that the proponent's draft plans were sufficient to establish baseline characteristics. No doubt, according to the state, deficiencies did exist in the application, but these were in the company's mine-operating and reclamation plans. After the state had reviewed these plans, the public was invited to comment on the draft plans. Activists and local citizens were not as sanguine as the state or the company about the environmental baseline study protocol, and challenged the environmental baseline studies on a number of counts. In a four-page letter, Don Bachman of the Greater Yellowstone Coalition detailed several inadequacies in the Company's baseline study proposal. here is no justification for a 6.5 mile radius for wildlife population studies when grizzly bears and other large animals regularly travel twenty miles in a day. '' (22) Throughout the first three years of the permitting process, activists continually sought clarification of the sometimes-vague company proposals. For example, Wade King of the Beartooth Alliance challenged the company's proposal to let the seeds from existing white bark pines revegetate the postmining landscape, remarking that it takes many years for this species of tree to produce viable cones. (23) In addition, activists countered company science with their own data and experts: Dr Robin Patten, an ecologist working for the Greater Yellowstone Coalition (GYC), noted that the only justification for the company choosing not to have a clay buffer between the waste rock and the liner was the lack of local bentonite deposits. Similarly, they insisted on more extensive monitoring activities than the company felt necessary: Richard Parks, Executive Director of the Bear Creek Council in Gardiner, Montana, suggested that the company needed to determine which way groundwater flowed in order to prevent cyanide contamination of the Fischer Creek acquifer.
Activists challenged the assumptions and proposals of the mining company and pushed for greater detail in the application. However, although they sought greater certainty regarding the impacts to the area from mining, the deeper they probed the more tenuous the company's science appeared. For example, at one point in the process the tailings impoundment was redesigned by Noranda from a dry-surface impoundment to a partially underground subaqueous storage impoundment. Noranda argued that this method of disposal should be the preferred alternative based on the scientific literature, produced primarily by the Mine Environmental Neutral Drainage Secretariat in Canada. However, with the help of the Mining Waste Section at Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) headquarters in Washington, GYC was able to call into question the validity of these findings. In a comment letter both GYC and EPA contended that the research Noranda relied upon to support its proposal was outdated and has been challenged. In fact, the previous year the secretariat sent out its own subaqueous research for peer review. However, very different conclusions were reached. In a letter to the GYC, Stephen Hoffman of the EPA wrote:`t his new review should be treated as the definitive source on the status of subaqueous disposal research ... . Noranda's lack of reference to this critical document places their conclusions in serious doubt.'' (24) The company's struggle to obtain a permit for its gold mine continued until 1996. By then, the controversy surrounding the proposed gold mine had received national attention, including that of the US President. In August of 1996, while on vacation in Yellowstone, President Clinton announced that a deal had been negotiated which ended the mine-permitting process. The US federal government would compensate the company US$64 million for its investment and interest in the property, and the land would be withdrawn from mineral exploration for a period of not less than twenty years. Furthermore, the company remained liable for meeting the Montana standards for reclaiming the New World District.
The New World Mine Project was the first of five permitting processes which were hotly contested during the 1990s. These later permit processes, though less celebrated compared with the symbolism and fanfare that surrounded Yellowstone, were no less contentious. The result, however, was the same. Mine-permitting processes across the state extended in time from months to years because NGOs, and some government agencies, were transforming the way nature was represented in the mine-permitting process. No longer were mining and the environment seen as unrelated: instead they were viewed as processes each with implications for the other. Although many actors in the Hardrock Bureau remained suspicious of this representation, they had little choice but to consider the concerns of NGOs and other government agencies and extend the mine-permitting process. With uncertainty increasing, the amount of time between initiation of the permit process and issue of a permit also increased. As the length of time to acquire a permit extended further, the number of potential gold mine permit applicants dwindledöto oneöas companies became increasingly aware that obtaining a permit in Montana was not only too lengthy but, perhaps, impossible. (25) Today, there are no pending permit applications on file at Montana's Hardrock Mining Bureau.
Regulation, discourse, and the Montana mine-permitting process Instead of accepting mining as the highest, and perhaps the only, use of land as matter of course, the Montana model was expanded to include other land values. No longer would miners have direct access to the land: now they were required to negotiate a bureaucracy and system of regulation. Many miners feared that the new environmental regulation would put an end to their industry; still others thought it quixotic. Direct access to resources was now mediated by the permitting process, which required extractive patrons to document the impacts of their activities with regard to other resources scientifically. The process took several ironic twists and turns: the Zortman and Landusky Mines allayed many fears as firms realized that this process imposed only minimal costs. In fact, it was only a minor deviation from what companies already had to do in their own processes of developing mine plans. This reading of the mine-permitting process held sway for a dozen years, until the New World Mine proposal. The New World Mine marked the beginning of a new period in Montana's mining history. Mine permits had taken an average of two years to receive; now, the permitting process would carry on for six or seven years or, in some cases, longer and with no clear endpoint. A striking contrast between these two periods of gold mine permitting is how the mine-permitting process accommodated the broader concerns brought forth by state and local environmental groups and state and federal agencies. What passed as adequate quantification of environmental impacts in the Zortman^Landusky process became wholly inadequate under the New World process. Moreover, the New World process was not a discreet moment: the discursive changes that were manifest in it became institutionalized into the mine-permitting process. The evidentiary requirements had been elevated for all gold mining projects (and other projects, too). Perhaps ironically, both approaches, in their own time, satisfied the rule of law, yet effected very different outcomes.
We may now return to the question posed in the introduction:``what happened to the mine-permitting process?'' A comparison of the two cases shows that during the early days of permitting mining companies and regulators analyzed environmental impacts through the lens of the mine-development plan. In particular, they viewed both environmental impact and reclamation plans through the lens of their mining technology. This is why they could be so sure about environmental impact without much baseline data. Conversely, the environmentalists involved in the New World Project rejected this analytical location, opting instead to focus on the uncertainties associated with the environmental baseline studies. Perhaps they were successful in their effort to stop the mine because they raised enough questions about traditional permitting practices. What is certain, though, is that the cultural shift in the construction of nature had material implications for the industry.
In this paper I have extended the regulationist account of reregulation to include intraregime discursive regulation. This approach, which views the regulatory process as a coded and recoded text with material implications, captures the cultural lineaments that influenced the trajectory of the mine-permitting process. These discursive features help explain the dramatic turn which the mine-permitting process took despite the relative inertia in the institutions and laws that govern it.
